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Beyond Market Socialism
In this report, the preceding chapters 
examined the overall tide of privatization of 
publicly-owned enterprises in China (Chapter 
1), progress in privatization of small and me-
dium enterprises (Chapter 2), and develop-
ments surrounding corporate governance and 
privatization of large enterprises (Chapters 3, 
4 and 5). On the basis of the analysis provid-
ed by the preceding chapters, this chapter will 
sum up the trends of privatization of public-
ly-owned enterprises, look at constraining fac-
tors going forward, and examine potential im-
pacts of privatization on China's politics and 
society.
6.1 Trends in Privatization of Public-
ly-owned Enterprises
China's privatization of publicly-owned enter-
prises began with privatization of small and 
medium sate-owned and collective enterpris-
es. The privatization drive was triggered by 
the deterioration of these enterprises' per-
formance amid intensifi ed market competi-
tion in the 1990s and the resultant fi scal diffi -
culties of local governments (Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2).
The dominant mode of early privatiza-
tion was the conversion to the employee own-
ership, which was more palatable to employ-
ees and more acceptable ideologically as well. 
Privatization through employee ownership 
proved effective in getting privatized enter-
prises out of the protection of local govern-
ments and also in strengthening intra-enter-
prise discipline. But the employee ownership 
with equal equity distribution came with 
the adverse effect that could not be negligi-
ble: ineffi ciency in decision-making. As the 
awareness of this problem grew and spread, 
the centralization of capital in the hands of 
managers/executives and the buyout by pri-
vate companies came to be encouraged as 
more favorable methods of privatization 
(Chapter 2).
After the 15th Congress of the CPC in 
1997 marked the start of the easing of polit-
ical constraints on privatization of publicly-
owned enterprises and business activities of 
private-sector companies, the waves of privati-
zation gradually spread to relatively large pub-
lic-owned enterprises. In particular, at state-
owned and collective enterprises that have 
achieved the impressive advancement in the 
market economy on the strength of top man-
agers' competence, moves emerged to seek de 
facto privatization at the initiatives of such top 
managers. Mailyard Group, the top exporter 
of apparel products to the Japanese market, 
and TCL, the second biggest manufacturer of 
home electric appliances after Hai-er, are the 
typical examples of such enterprises (Chap-
ters 3 and 4).
Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese gov-
ernment has been promoting the reorgani-
zation of public enterprises into joint stock 
companies and their stock exchange listings 
as part of the broader corporate reform of 
state-owned and collective enterprises. Some 
of the most prominent state-owned enterpris-
es have already been listed on the stock ex-
changes, such as Baoshan Iron and Steel and 
Sinopec Corp. The reorganization into joint 
stock companies and exchange listings can 
be considered as a step in the phased priva-
tization process. However, the ratios of state-
owned equity shares in exchange-listed state-
owned enterprises still remain high at several-
dozen percentages. There have been frequent 
instances where state-owned parents of ex-
change-listed state-owned enterprises have 
"exploited" small shareholders by taking ad-
vantage of their effective control over ex-
change-listed enterprises, consequently de-
stabilizing management of listed enterprises 
(Chapters 3 amd 4). This problem combined 
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with the pressing need for fi nancing the 
shortfall of pension funds led to the launch 
of the new policy to sell state-owned shares 
in exchange-listed enterprises. This develop-
ment shifted the spotlight to ways to foster in-
stitutional investors as the emerging players 
in the area of corporate governance in place 
of state-owned major shareholders.
6.2 Constraining Factors in Privati-
zation
The policy shift of the CPC that grad-
ually occurred from 1997 through 1999 sig-
nifi cantly relaxed the political and ideolog-
ical constraints over privatization. The tone 
against "de-socialization" of China is still no-
ticeable, but it is no longer expected to sway 
the systemic transformation. However, atten-
tion needs to be paid to the existence of vari-
ous down-to-earth constraints standing in the 
way of further progress in privatization.
Shortage of Eligible Agents of Privatization 
There is a severe shortage of corporate man-
agers or private companies that can promote 
privatization especially in the Inland Region. 
Efforts have been reinforced to facilitate in-
vestment from other regions, but serious 
problems remain, including the gap of infor-
mation between regions and the lack of un-
derstanding about the market economy on 
the part of local governments. In the Inland 
Region, bankruptcy proceedings are likely to 
play a more important role than privatization 
in the reorganization of publicly-owned enter-
prises.
Shortage of Employment Opportunities   Whether 
through privatization or bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the reorganization of publicly-owned en-
terprises inevitably lead to job reductions of 
varying degrees. While the employment prob-
lem has been relatively less serious in the 
Coastal Region because of the services sector 
with the fairly large capacity to create jobs, it 
is the major constraining factor in the corpo-
rate reorganization in the Inland Region.
Fiscal constraints  Fiscal expenditures are es-
sential in fi nancing employment measures 
in the wake of reductions of redundant la-
bor and also to cope with the loss of capital 
of banks resulted from bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The government sector's dwindling fi s-
cal capabilities will likely prove the most im-
portant factor that constrains the pace of the 
reorganization of publicly-owned enterprises 
that are still expected to be pushed mainly by 
privatization or bankruptcy proceedings.
Embryonic Capital Market   As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the underdevelopment of the cap-
ital market poses the biggest problem for the 
progress in privatization of large publicly-
owned enterprises that is expected to go into 
full gear going forward. There exists the risk 
of growing instability of corporate manage-
ment unless a viable new framework for cor-
porate governance is developed as the govern-
ment makes a gradual exist as a major player 
in corporate governance through the disposi-
tion of state-owned shares. What is needed as 
the new framework is an effi cient capital mar-
ket with the participation of institutional in-
vestors who make investment from a long-
term perspective. But, as the experiences of 
other countries indicate, the development 
of an effi cient capital market requires some 
time.
Given the above-described constraints, 
the privatization process going forward can-
not help but be gradual. As for large enter-
prises in particular, it has to be assumed that 
the transitional system will remain in place 
for some time, with the CPC and the govern-
ment still playing certain roles in the corpo-
rate governance of those enterprises. What 
sort of corporate organization do we expect 
to see emerging from this transitional peri-
od? How is the anticipated new form of cor-
porate organization going to affect corporate 
behaviors and industrial development in Chi-
na in the future? All these matters are subject 
to our future research.
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6.3 Outlook: Impact on Politics and 
Society
All the chapters of this report exclusive-
ly focused on the transformation of the cor-
porate system, the central issue in privatiza-
tion in China. But it is easily conceivable that 
the extensive progress in privatization is go-
ing to have a deep impact on China's politics 
and society.
As typically seen in privatization of small 
and medium state-owned and collective en-
terprises, the privatization process is divid-
ing employees who, realities aside, supposedly 
formed the core of these enterprises as equal 
workers, into the two distinct categories: cor-
porate mangers/executives and ordinary 
workers. Obviously, the disparity in income 
between the two categories of people is wid-
ening. Needless to say, workers discharged in 
the wake of the ongoing corporate reorgani-
zation have to be content with even lower in-
come. Privatization is likely to cause a further 
widening in the income gap.
Corporate managers and executives who 
raise their heads through the privatization 
process are expected to join private-sector en-
trepreneurs to form a new social class. This 
group of people who elevated their social sta-
tus amid the birth and growth of China's mar-
ket economy possess the concept of values in 
strong support of market competition. They 
will likely be the driving force for China's fur-
ther shift to the market-based economy, up-
holding such principles as the protection of 
private property and fair competition.
At the same time, they recognize that 
the stability of the CPC-led government is an 
element indispensable for the further promo-
tion of the market economy in China. From 
outside and within the CPC, they are expect-
ed to perform the role of reinforcing the mar-
ket-oriented developmentalistic nature of the 
Party.
(Ken-ichi IMAI)
